Iranian, and Iraqi hydrocarbon sources. In the future, it could also serve as a transit country for the gas originating in Egypt, Israel and Cyprus. This is an impressive potential, but there are some issues that need to be discussed in this regard. First, offering an alternative route for the Russian gas is welcomed, but the European energy security would be best enhanced by searching for different suppliers rather than different routes. 1 Second, these days, the transportation of Iranian and Iraqi hydrocarbons still faces severe security and political obstacles. And third, the Azerbaijani option is so far foreseen to provide only a limited amount of gas for Europe (specifically 10 bcm, p. 31). This is why the authors prominently devote attention to the question of the East Med gas piping. The so-called Levantine Basin is a hydrocarbon-rich, mostly offshore area located between Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Cyprus with significant natural gas reserves exceeding the Algerian reserves by almost one third (p. 103). So far, only Israel and Egypt are drilling the East Med gas, and only for domestic consumption (Ministry of Energy 2013; Eni 2018) . But prospectively, a surplus of the gas could be exported. On several occasions the authors highlight that transporting these resources to Europe in any other way than via Turkey (e.g. via the Israel-Cyprus-Greece-Italy undersea pipeline or an LGN terminal) would be economic nonsense. Although this claim is probably true, the economic considerations do not always prevail when the actors involved are confronted with the (geo)political realities, especially in sectors deemed strategic. 2 In this context, a proposed solution that would involve exchanging Cypriot gas for water (p. 131) would be quite cheap when viewed from a purely economic perspective, but incredibly costly in terms of selling it to the Greek Cypriot public due to both strategic and legal concerns. 3 Additionally, another questionable issue is whether the EU believes that its energy security would truly be enhanced by piping all South-Eastern hydrocarbons only via Turkey, given the Turkish internal political and security development (Austvik and Rzayeva 2016) . This point now gains an even bigger importance because in August 2018 the Caspian states -after more than twenty years of disputes over the status of the Caspian Sea -finally reached an agreement that could allow for building an undersea gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan, Turkey and Europe (Soukup 2018) . It is to be noted that the authors of the book considered this deal unlikely (pp. 48, 52).
The monograph also argues that in the long term perspective, economic forces (labelled as "rational choice") sooner or later prevail over bilateral disputes -and the authors then serve as advocates of this idea throughout the rest of the book. The authors admit that it is written not with the intention to neutrally evaluate the pros and cons of Turkey serving as a possible regional energy hub, but in defence of Turkey's role as such. As the Professors themselves put it, "This monograph is dedicated to the idea that Europe and Turkey are obliged to become energy partners" (p. 1). From my perspective, this is an unfortunate approach. Although in many of the points they make, they might be right, at least the cover-box of their "burger" should have been made in a more appealing form. For a reader, it is always better to think that they are allowed to form their own opinion instead of being forced to accept someone else's view.
Amidst the monograph's other weaknesses I can point out its rather short length of 146 pages, which didn't allow the co-authors to evolve a deeper argumentation in support of their perspective. For example, the description of Turkey's view on the delimitation of its exclusive economic zone in the Mediterranean is underdeveloped. In my opinion, it would be interesting to read a more thorough discussion of the Greek/Greek Cypriot and Turkish argumentation, but -true enough -such a discussion would probably exceed the scope of the econocentric focus they have chosen. Finally, I have to note that there are also several inconsistencies (for example, the name of the Syrian president Assad is sometimes spelled "Esad" and at other times "Asad", pp. 65, 116-117), typing errors ("peacepeaking" mission, p. 140), and mistakes ("the European Court of Justice" is mentioned in place of "the International Court of Justice", p. 95) that skipped the attention of the editors.
The monograph represents the 60 th contribution to the Springer series "Lecture Notes in Energy", which aims to cover new developments in the study of energy, and is meant to provide a bridge between advanced textbooks and the forefront of research. Its model readers, according to Springer, include those "wishing to gain an accessible introduction to a field of research", and those "with a need for an up-to-date reference book on a welldefined topic" (Springer 2018) . I can sum up that the book indeed fits these criteria, and I would recommend it for everyone interested in the energy security of the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as those focussing on Greco-Turkish/Cypriot-Turkish relations. It offers a concise overview of the current state of affairs in the field of energy security in the region, and a brief Turkish glimpse of it. However, readers hungry for a thorough analysis of the possible Turkish role in the Southern Energy Corridor should address themselves not only to this "fast food", as it would be appropriate to supplement it with another dish.
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